Eliminate the economics Ph. D, period. Offer everyone three years of graduate economics education, and no more with a clock reset allowed for pregnancy. Did Smith, Keynes, or Hayek have an economics Ph. This way, no one will assume you know what you are talking about, and the underlying message is that economics learning is lifelong. Of course, in that setting, schools could take chances on more students, and more students could take a chance on trying economics as a profession.
Furthermore, for most of the most accomplished students, it is already clear they deserve a top job by the time their third year rolls around, usually well before then. Women would hit their tenure clocks much earlier, also, easing childbearing constraints. A dissertation truly would become just a job market paper, which has already been the trend for a long time. Finish everyone, and throw them into the maws of some mix of AI and human evaluators sooner rather than later. Over time, I would expect that more people would take the first-year sequence in their senior year of undergraduate study, and more first-year jobs would have zero or very low teaching loads.
All to the better.
The lawsuit Students For Fair Admissions v. Harvard University provided an unprecedented look at how an elite school makes admissions decisions. Removing preferences for athletes and legacies would significantly alter the racial distribution of admitted students, with the share of white admits falling and all other groups rising or remaining unchanged.
Am I allowed to observe that this seems wrong to me? And from Garett Jones :. Controlling for academic traits and much else, being Asian American predicts a substantially lower probability of Harvard admission… And being female predicts a substantially higher probability of admission. Here is the full paper. For the pointer I thank various MR readers. It is the first comic book aimed at blind people, featuring a blind character and made by a blind creator. Housewives and UBI. YouTube as an educational accelerant. Window or aisle seat? Window open or closed? On the Boeing crashes NYT. Alex Tabarrok Email Alex Follow atabarrok.
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Delivery in days Free hrrhrhrhhr Delivery Charges: Rs. Additional Handling Charges are levied for other expenses incurred while delivering to your location. More Delivery Options. Delivery in days. Of the ten groups that tried B at some point, all but one ended up choosing B in the last voting round.
Of the 11 groups that chose A in the last round, only one had ever tried playing B before. We now turn to the pull effect. Recall from Section 3 that it can only pay players to vote for B if they believe coordination will succeed. But if players believe that coordination will succeed, then they will want to contribute when playing B. Hence, players who expect coordination to succeed when playing B should be more inclined to vote for B and to contribute when B is chosen. Players who expect coordination to fail should be less inclined to vote for B and to contribute when B is chosen. For the groups that play A there is no significant difference between A-voters and B-voters.
What drives their contribution decision is their decision when playing A previously: the lower a player's average contribution in the previous phase the less likely the player is to contribute in the first round of the next phase. In other words, free riders tend to remain free riders and cooperators tend to remain cooperators. Regressions include group dummies, which are insignificant and not shown here. Lagged individual contribution in A: average number of red cards contributed in the previous phase of playing A.
Interestingly, lagged contributions in the A game do not have a significant effect on contributions in the first round after a group has switched to B. Thus, whether a subject was a free rider or a cooperator in the A game did not affect how this player behaved in the B game. However, we find a significant difference in the contributions of the players who vote for A and the players who vote for B: B-voters are more likely to contribute than A-voters when playing the B game for the first time. This implies that B-voters must be more optimistic about coordination succeeding in the B game—presumably the reason they voted for B in the first place.
This is the pull effect. In Vote-First-B-8 , we distinguish between groups that played A every time and those that played B at least once. Two observations stand out. First, expectations for successful coordination are very high in Vote-First-B They are also high in Vote-First-B-8 for the groups that played B at least once. Though we cannot exclude the possibility that these beliefs were formed while the game was played rather than before it was played, the beliefs expressed are at least consistent with the pull effect.
By contrast, expectations for successful coordination are noticeably lower for the individuals in groups that never played B in Vote-First-B Second, almost all the players in Vote-First-B would recommend that a new group of participants play B rather than A. By contrast, individuals who took part in Vote-First-B-8 were divided. A large majority of those who played A every time would recommend A, whereas most of the players who played B at least once would recommend B—further confirmation of the pull effect.
We also asked our participants in an open-ended question to give the reason for their recommendation. Many of the players in Vote-First-B-8 who played A every time and who also recommended that others play A said that, in their view, game A was the better game. We have so far demonstrated that there exists both a push and a pull effect. We know that the push effect is necessary and that the pull effect alone is not sufficient because no group chose B without first trying A. Here we report the results of a new treatment. This shows that the pull effect is also necessary in order for players to choose B over A.
Analysis of this new treatment also provides further evidence for the push effect. In the new treatment, the players must choose between A and B In contrast to Vote-First-B-8 , however, the players must have experience playing both games before choosing. In one version of the new treatment, A-First , the players must play the A game in the first phase and the B game in the second phase.
After that, they play the same way as in the Vote-First treatments, voting and then playing five contribution rounds in the third phase, and then repeating this sequence in the fourth and final phase. In Vote-First , the players must discover for themselves which game is best to play without the benefit of experience—a situation that comes closest to the real world examples we discuss in Section 5.
The reason for the Play-First treatment is to see if and how behavior changes when players have experience playing both games before voting. By comparing this treatment with Vote-First we can thus determine how expectations in both games affect group behavior. By having the players play A first followed by B, or B first followed by A, we can also determine whether the order of experience has a separate effect from the experience itself.
We thus pool the data for both versions and call the combined treatment Play-First-B Our focus is on whether the outcomes observed in the first two phases of Play-First , when all groups are required to play both A and B precisely once, affect the choice of which game to play in the second two phases. We are also interested in knowing how the choices made in these two voting phases compare with the choices made in the first two voting phases of Vote-First. Before turning to these questions, we should note that contributions and payoffs, conditional on the game that has been chosen, reflect a similar pattern as before.
The important difference between Vote-First-B-8 and Play-First-B-8 lies in the choice of which game to play in the first two voting phases phases one and two for Vote-First-B-8 and phases three and four for Play-First-B We infer from this evidence that the contrast in behavior between the two treatments reflects a difference in expectations with this difference being shaped by behavior in the nonvoting phases of Play-First.
We can also compare behavior in the third and fourth phases of the Play-First and Vote-First treatments. In this comparison, groups in both treatments have gained the same amount of experience. The difference is that, in Play-First , this experience was imposed upon the groups, whereas in Vote-First , it was chosen by the groups. In the latter cases, this experience was also, for most groups, incomplete that is, the groups had experience playing only one game.
In this comparison, as with the previous one, more groups chose the B game in Play-First than in Vote-First 8 vs. This shows that both kinds of experience help but that having experience playing both games seems to help a little more. The surprise, perhaps, is that any group would choose A in the voting phases of Play-First-B The reason for this failure is probably due to the players being denied any opportunity to signal their intentions by voting.
When coordination on the mutually preferred equilibrium failed in the nonvoting phases, groups always chose to play A in the voting phases. Chastened by their bad experience playing B, these groups never attempted to play B again. A bad experience when playing B made these groups pessimistic about the prospects of coordination succeeding, squelching the pull effect. Of course, the reasoned argument of Section 3 for the use of voting as a signaling device for coordination should not be affected by the way the game was played previously, in the phase in which groups were made to play B.
Once given the opportunity to vote for which game to play, the players should have understood that the rules of the game had changed, and adjusted their expectations—and, hence, their behavior—accordingly. The fact that the groups that failed to coordinate when made to play B did not subsequently vote for B suggests that a majority of the members of these groups conditioned their expectations on the way their group members played in the past rather than thinking strategically about the future.
This demonstrates that the push effect is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for switching, and that the pull effect is also necessary. Apart from the five groups that failed to coordinate in the nonvoting phases of Play-First , only two other groups 49 and 60 played A in the final phase of this treatment. These groups probably voted for A in the final voting phase believing or hoping that their contributions, which were high when they played B previously, would remain high if they switched to A, yielding them a larger payoff.
We will never know, but it seems that these groups probably regretted this last switch, and that they would have chosen differently had they to do over again. When coordination succeeded in the B game, making the players optimistic about the prospects for coordination, groups chose B over A. When coordination failed in the B game, making the players pessimistic about the prospects for coordination, groups chose A over B. Note finally that Play-First also provides more evidence of the push effect.
Groups that performed poorly when playing A in the nonvoting phase chose to play B at the first opportunity. Groups that performed better when playing A in the nonvoting phases needed to play A in another frustrating phase before switching to B. Did these groups make a mistake? Would they have done better by playing the B game?
It is impossible to tell. On the one hand, every group that switched to B changed its behavior and did better. On the other hand, the groups that voted for A did so because they had different expectations for how they would behave when playing B, and expectations are of crucial importance to how these games are actually played. Though we cannot be sure how the groups that played A would have done if they had played B, we can compare the payoffs of the A-voters who got their way, and were able to play A because of how their co-players voted, with the payoffs of the A-voters who found themselves in a minority, and were thus forced to play B.
Two pieces of evidence show that the A-voters who played A earned less than the A-voters who were forced to play B. The first piece of evidence comes from between-group comparisons. It shows that A-voters always earned more when playing the B game than when playing the A game. The differences in between-group behavior within the same phase are not statistically significant in the second and the third phases, but note that we have only few observations for these two phases.
Stony Brook Center for Game Theory
The second piece of evidence comes from within-group comparisons. Here, also, the differences become more pronounced when we look at contributions under the two regimes. This last result shows that the A-voters who had to play B were not only grouped with co-players who behaved differently, but that they themselves behaved differently under the two regimes.
An interesting question is when these A-voters changed their behavior. It could be that, once B had been chosen, the A-voters thought more carefully about this game, noticed that voting to play this game signaled intentions, and saw that it was now in their best interest to contribute. Such a result would suggest that these individuals supported the A game before because they had not thought carefully enough about how others would play the B game or how they themselves would play this game.
An alternative hypothesis is that the A-voters changed their behavior only in later rounds, after they had observed how the B-voters contributed. In numbers: Out of the 17 A-voters who lost the vote, 12 made the same contribution decision in the two rounds just before and after the switch. Only four A-voters changed their decision from not contributing to contributing and one individual changed from contributing to not contributing.
The B-voters behaved very differently. Of the 33 B-voters who got their way in the vote, 27 changed their contribution decision after the switch from not contributing to contributing, five did not change their decision, and one changed from contributing to not contributing. These results suggest that the majority of A-voters were initially pessimistic about the prospects of coordination succeeding in the B game but became more optimistic over time. By the end of each phase of playing B, they all contributed. By contrast, the majority of B-voters seemed to be optimistic about the prospects of coordination succeeding from the very beginning.
As discussed in Section 3 , ambiguity about the prospects of coordination succeeding in B-8 should be resolved by vote signaling. It thus appears that the A-voters who did not contribute when B was chosen might have failed to read this signal. This failure can also help to explain why these people voted for A in the first place. However, when the A-voters were out-voted and had to play B, they learned that they do better by contributing, since all groups coordinated flawlessly by the end of every phase in which B was played.
As a consequence, and as mentioned before, when we compare behavior at the phase-level, A-voters contributed and earned more when they were forced to play B than when they played A. Unfortunately, the A-voters who were in the majority never had the chance to learn how to behave when playing B. In this section we show how our experimental results can be helpful for interpreting three real world examples of international agreements adopting different approaches. MARPOL establishes a technology standard for oil tankers, ensuring that a tanker's oil cargo is kept physically separate from its ballast water.
Previously, most oil pollution in the oceans resulted from tankers flushing out their ballast water mixed with oil. Under MARPOL, however, port states can protect their coasts simply by restricting entry to tankers meeting the new standard—that is, by banning trade involving the old technology. As the global market for ocean shipping is characterized by strong network externalities, this technology-standards approach creates incentives for port states and tanker owners alike to adopt the new standard once assured that a critical mass of others will adopt the new standard. However, choice of this approach came at a cost.
They first sought to reduce discharges directly and they persisted in trying to make this approach work for more than 50 years. It was not until the s that they switched to the technology-standards approach. Montreal restricts both the consumption and production of chlorofluorocarbons CFCs , while also banning trade in CFCs and products containing CFCs between parties and nonparties. Under Montreal, provided enough countries limit their consumption of CFCs, exporters want to produce the CFC substitutes; and provided enough countries produce the substitutes, importers want to limit their consumption of CFCs.
As in our Vote-First-B treatment, negotiators of the Montreal Protocol adopted the coordination approach right from the start.
Crowding out Citizenship 1
Kyoto specifies national greenhouse gas emission limits without the support of an agreed enforcement mechanism. The United States refused to ratify the agreement, Canada withdrew from it, and Japan, New Zealand, and Russia decided not to participate in the Protocol's second phase. Although other countries—notably members of the European Union—have taken steps to reduce their emissions, overall the agreement has had little if any effect Aichele and Felbermayr Interestingly, Kyoto incorporates several flexible implementation mechanisms including a provision allowing emissions trading.
The people who negotiated Kyoto thus focused their attention on cost-effectiveness, not enforcement. The difference is that the national contributions pledged in Paris were chosen independently rather than negotiated and are explicitly recognized as being voluntary. It was little noticed at the time, but the same group of countries that met in Paris in December agreed a month before in Dubai to commence negotiation of an amendment to the Montreal Protocol to phase down hydrofluorocarbons, a chemical that does not destroy the ozone layer but that is a powerful greenhouse gas.
Our research suggests that this amendment is to be welcomed, and that negotiators would do well to explore further opportunities for tipping, including second best approaches like technology standards combined with trade restrictions. In many settings players can decide on the rules of the game before they begin playing the game. For example, when negotiators meet to adopt an international agreement to provide a public good, they must decide which game to play.
A prisoners' dilemma can potentially achieve the overall first best outcome, but collective action in this game is difficult to enforce. Collective action is easier to enforce in a tipping game, but coordination in this game may not be assured and choice of this game may foreclose the possibility of attaining the first best.
The problem with choosing between these games is that players cannot be certain which game will work best. Our experiment shows that players are quick to choose the tipping game when doing so enables them to sustain the overall first best outcome and when this outcome is risk-dominant. We do not know if these groups would have been able to coordinate in the B game were they to have played B. After all, if group members are pessimistic about coordination succeeding, failure in the B game will be a self-fulfilling prophecy. We do know, however, that it was beneficial for the A-voters to lose the vote.
The A-voters who were out-voted and thus made to play B did better than the A-voters who were in the majority and got to play their preferred game.
https://www.laitilanpuhelin.fi/sites/default/files/app/jaz-como-localizar.php The loss gave these players an opportunity to update their expectations and learn about the strategic advantage of the tipping game. This was not possible for the A-voters who won the vote. However, this tendency is unusually striking and persistent in our experiment. This game appears to be the default choice when players are unsure how the two games will be played. Why do only some groups switch?
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Our interpretation of this result is that many voters seem oblivious of the signaling effect of voting. It remains for future research to show whether our results are unique to the game choice studied in our experiment or whether these results reflect a more general tendency for a significant fraction of players to misapprehend the meaning of signals.
In other words, are there ways to change the possibly self-fulfilling expectations of an entire group of players? Here we provide the instructions for the Vote-First-B treatment, translated from German. Instructions for the other treatments are available upon request. In our experiment you can earn money. How much you earn will depend on the game-play, or more precisely on the decisions you and your fellow co-players make.
For a successful run of this experiment, it is essential that you do not talk to other participants. Now read the following rules of the game carefully. If you have any questions, give us a hand signal. We will come to you and answer them. There are five players in your group, meaning you and four other players. Each player is faced with the same decision problem.
All decisions are anonymous.