But this is even more difcult to know! It can also lead to tautological reasoning: we know a factor was present if the outcome is present, or it may lead us to nd only what we are seek- ing to establish. The only solution to such difculties which retains the complex and qualitative nature of the factors is to acknowledge them and discuss the evidence for each case as honestly and thoroughly as one can.
It goes without saying that contrary evidence must be considered, and that interpretations regarding each factor for any case may be disputed and argued over. The methodological eld in which this study lies is that of comparative- historical sociology. Theda Skocpols work on France, Russia, and China in States and Social Revolutions sets in many ways the standards for such work and is the model for this effort, whatever our theoretical differences.
As she notes, with so few and such complex cases, one cannot mean- ingfully quantify the results. The theory can then be further tested by a Method of Difference in which one considers cases where both the outcome and its causes are absent or less evident, if on a spectrum , but which are in other important ways rather similar to the positive, or successful cases.
Boolean qualitative comparative analysis is more suitable for this kind of comparative work than either Mills meth- ods of agreement and difference alone or than quantitative analysis. Both Theorizing revolutions 27 alternatives are ruled out by the number of cases: there are still too few to quantify results yet too many to analyze by simple inspection.
More- over, Boolean analysis permits the possibility of more than one path to the same outcome, which Skocpols understanding of Millian logic does not; when dealing with multiple types of failure, this assumption more adequately reects the social world. Finally, unlike quantitative analysis, Boolean analysis treats each case holistically: that is, the causal factors are kept intact as wholes and seen as combinatorial in effect, rather than statistically reduced to proportional contributions to a given outcome.
The pitfalls of comparative-historical work must also be borne in mind. There is the preliminary issue of comparability of cases; one does not usu- ally want to be comparing apples with pears. Here the selection of success- ful Third World social revolutions denes a response to this problem: our theory is intended in the rst instance to apply only to such cases.
Could it be modied to consider the revolutions in France, Russia, or Eastern Europe? I believe that it could, and that a broad combina- torial logic would shed newlight on these cases, but this is a project which must be left for another place and time and perhaps scholar! Related to this is the issue of world-time: Skocpol, following Wolfram Eberhard, counsels awareness of the impact of changing international structures e. Another logical problem is the overlooking of some important causal factor, to which ones theory renders one blind. Here I think the greater inclusion of culture and agency in my model overcomes a key omission of Skocpol and in this sense tries to apply a dialectical as well as a comparative- historical method , 89 but other theorists may detect key factors missing in both perspectives.
The in-depth under- standing of even a single culture in its historical breadth can be a lifes work, and inherently limited. There is no way to avoid this if one wants to search for meaningful causal regularities or interpretive patterns. My own best case is that of Iran, the subject of a full-scale previous study; I have for some time now also taught and researched on Latin America and the Third World generally in addition to the Middle East, and it is this long leap that has generated the present ambitious framework in the rst place.
This work relies on and is in dialogue with that of all the 28 Part One: Perspectives country specialists whose works are cited in these pages, and is open to their considered criticisms and amendments of particular cases. Indeed, I have consulted a number of them in the course of working on each case. This brings us to the issue of sources. To the degree possible, and depending on the case, a certain amount of primary data have been con- sulted to ll in a few of the gaps in the existing literature and to enter into some of the disputed points.
Hunger, War, Rage
In particular, I have selectively con- sulted census data to form a deeper impression of certain aspects of social structure; newspaper accounts both in the United States and in the countries themselves for data on the activities of the protagonists in each revolutionary struggle; interviews with revolutionary participants conducted by my students in their own work; and some archival materi- als on the role of the United States as the principal foreign power with an important stake in many of the events.
To be sure, I have only been able to scratch the surface here, but the effort has been made to go modestly beyond the secondary accounts, while realizing that they are the major sources for this project and trusting themto have consulted a much wider range of the relevant primary data. The secondary historiography and social science on each case consti- tutes the bulk of the data.
When working on so many major events in the history of twentieth-century social change, it can only be so. Moreover, the amount and quality of the material available is impressive in itself, particularly the historians on Mexico, the oldest case, and the social scien- tists on Iran and Nicaragua, which have attracted a great deal of attention. The cases of Cuba and China have also inspired vast literatures, though these are of uneven quality and much of it is polemical; these are also the countries which have been most difcult for outsiders to study on the spot rivaled in this by Iran, but over a much shorter period.
The syn- thesis offered here draws on the best of the available secondary work on each case, systematically seeking data and evidence on the questions and factors that are of interest to us. Indeed, I have needed so many research assistants to help me get a handle on the multiple histories considered in this book that it is correct to say I have often been forced to work with tertiary sources: the notes taken by my research assistants on some of the key secondary historiography!
I have endeavored to do all the research for the cases in Chapter Two by myself, and have done my best to fact-check and properly contextualize the data collected on two dozen other cases in this way by my team. The plan of the book is as follows. Chapter 2 analyzes in chronolog- ical turn each of the ve major successful Third World social revolu- tions that history offers us.
Each case is systematically approached within the heuristic framework laid out in this chapter. Chapters 3 and 4 then Theorizing revolutions 29 map the variations of success represented by the anti-colonial revolu- tions of the twentieth century and a set of shorter-lived revolutionary successes that ended in reversal.
The task of Chapter 5 is to draw into the discussion a set of key contrasting cases: attempted social revolutions and political revolutions from Latin America to Africa and Asia. The overarching similarities to the successful revolutions, as well as the key differences in terms of the explanatory factors hypothesized above, will be brought out. A concluding chapter assesses the patterns that emerge out of the historical record and speculates on the future of revolutions in a new century. The challenge is to fashion a controlled test of this theory out of the mass of raw data and multitude of conicting interpretations available to us, and to advance the theoretical eld a few steps forward, while simultaneously doing justice to the richness of each of the cases.
This book thus seeks to unify several historical elds in a comparative and theoretical social scientic synthesis of the trajectories of a number of seemingly distant or small countries which have had a disproportionate impact on the world we inhabit. It goes part of the way necessary toward understanding the century we have just left and perhaps in a modest way to make the one we have entered recently more hopeful in its inevitable moments of upheaval and transformation.
Part Two Revolutionary success 2 The great social revolutions No misunderstanding of Marx is more grotesque than the one which suggests that he expected a revolution exclusively in the advanced indus- trial countries of the West. The list of the undisputed social revolutions of the twentieth century is a short one Russia in , China in , Cuba in To this list I propose to add three more: the Mexican revolution of , the Iranian of , and the Nicaraguan of the same year.
But for the Sandinistas falling from power through the unprecedented medium of elections in , the last choice would be uncontroversial. The Mexican and Iranian cases, as was noted in Chapter One, have their doubters because, in the absence of a socialist agenda in either case, and given the defeat of the most radical forces in each Zapata and Villa, the Iranian left , the degree of social transformation that followed fell clearly short of its potential. But each undid a dictatorship and launched or furthered substantial projects of economic and social change. If the French revolution was a social revolution, then so were the Mexican and Iranian.
Absent fromthis list are a fewother cases, some of which will be treated later in this book. The revolution that overthrewHaile Selassie in Ethiopia led to signicant change, but was made by a handful of military men and the same can be said of the Afghan Marxists who seized power in , or the brutal regime of Pol Pot in Cambodia in the s, mer- cifully reversed a decade later in the latter instance and tragically so in the former.
The massive anti-colonial movements in Algeria, Vietnam, Mozambique, Angola, and Rhodesia are each closer to the ve social rev- olutions treated here than to any of these others, but they were movements not against internal despots but external usurpers, and will be treated in their own right in the chapter that follows. The reversed revolutions in Guatemala , Iran , Bolivia , Chile 73 , Jamaica , and Grenada also will prove to have 33 34 Part Two: Revolutionary success much in common with the great social revolutions, but they too will be treated as a slight variant on the theme, in Chapter Four.
The present chapter aims then to nd the common thread among ve of the six social revolutions of the twentieth century, excluding only Russia from its purview. That such a thread exists at all across three major geo- graphic zones Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America or up to ve if one attends to the nuances among Mexico, the Caribbean, and Cen- tral America is itself prima facie evidence that there is such a thing as the Third World and that its revolutions have much in common.
In telling this story, however, we shall also see that each case possesses unique features and contributes its own part to our understanding of the general model adopted in this study. That is, we shall learn some- thing of such matters as the workings of dependent development and dictatorship, the varieties of political cultures of opposition, the nature of economic downturns, and the range of ways in which external pressure may be made ineffective. And we shall begin to see the many ways in which large-scale structures shape, yet do not determine, events made by humans, who everywhere have brought creativity, imagination, and courage to the historical table.
Mexicos unnished revolution, 1 Our tale begins with a case among the most difcult to analyze, for the Mexican revolution was a complex, multi-sided event, with sharp twists and turns over the course of a decade. I shall argue that the social revolu- tion reached its apogee in late with the arrival of Villa and Zapata in Mexico City, and that it was subsequently defeated militarily in by Obreg on and Carranza, who then laid the groundwork for the car- rying out of a less thorough-going social transformation in the s and beyond.
The victory or moment of all-out social revolution in Mexico was thus quite brief. We will nevertheless analyze it as the rst great social revolution of the twentieth century, and the last non-Marxist one until Iran and Eastern Europe toward the end of the century. Nor can the revolution be easily characterized: Was it a bourgeois revolution overthrowing feudalism, or a failed socialist or proletarian revolution? The labels peasant, popular, democratic, national- ist, and anti-imperialist have been attached to it, while the outcome has been variously proclaimed a victory, a defeat, or a permanent, unnished, or interrupted revolution leading up to the present.
Our present task sorting out the causes of the revolution, is complicated by the long duration of The great social revolutions 35 its course, which featured several distinct phases: the uprising against Porrio Daz, the Constitutionalist movement against the dictator Huerta, and the bloody inghting of between the victors to that point.
Mexican social and political structure on the eve of the revolution has also received various labels feudal, capitalist, oligarchic, autocratic, neo-colonial. At the bottom of the social structure, about one-third of the population were indigenous peoples of diverse cultures, and there were small black and Chinese populations. Alan Knight notes that ethnic categories represented uid, sociocultural identities, based on language, dress, income, food, literacy and domicile. Peasants, the land- less, and indentured rural workers were found at the bottom, their urban counterparts being workers, artisans, and the unemployed.
There were middle-class ranchers in the countryside, and an intelligentsia and pro- fessionals in the cities. Women were located across the class structure, though structurally disadvantaged as well. Galeano claims: In Mexico City, out of every ten young women, two engage d in prostitution. The dramatic transformation of this social structure during the reign of Porrio Daz from to constitutes a textbook case of depen- dent development. A few simple statistics demonstrate the remarkable growth that occurred: Population grew by 1. Rail- roads expanded from kilometers of track in to 24, by Sugar output rose ve times, henequen eleven times.
Gross domestic product grew from million pesos to 1, million between and In aggregate terms, this meant growth from pesos per capita in to by In all, foreign capital controlled 90 percent of Mexicos eighty largest capitalized busi- ness concerns, including nine of the top ten.
American companies and individuals controlled about 80 percent of mining, owned over million acres of land, and provided 57 percent of imports, while taking Rail- roads had a north-south orientation, reecting American needs. These investments in Mexico came to 45 percent of all USinvestments abroad. Peasants were increasingly squeezed from their land and proletarian- ized as large-scale latifundios encroached on their communal holdings in places like Morelos, where sugar plantations grew rapidly. While no denitive regional gures exist, by one estimate 90 percent of central plateau people were landless on the eve of the revolution, and 67 percent in the provinces of Mexico, Michoac an, and Veracruz.
Agricultural pro- duction grew at about 0. By , the railroad building spree was over, industry was contracting, and rural migrants crowded the cities. The cost of staples far outstripped the purchasing power of wages, which in real terms were the same in as a cen- tury before. The great social revolutions 37 The authoritarian character of the Porrian state has been well docu- mented. Its slogan, Pan y palo Bread and the stick , suggests the combination of cooptation and repression that undergirded it.
Porrio Daz came to power in a popular movement in and ruled contin- uously till , with the exception of Elections were regu- larly held but the results cynically manipulated: Civilian politicians were controlled through a vast patronage machine that oversaw appointments from the level of village cacique political boss to state governor, some of whom ruled for twenty or more years, enriching themselves in the process.
The army could eld 14, regular troops there were 30, on paper , 2, rurales to police the countryside, and several thousand irregulars, in addition to the local police. It was poorly fed and treated at the lower levels and its commanders were rotated at the top to ensure loyalty to Daz. This force was increasingly called upon to do repres- sive duty as Daz aged: strikers were killed at the Cananea mine in and at the Rio Blanco textile mill a year later.
In the provinces, the citizenry was subjected to arbitrary nes, impressment, deportation, even. When Francisco Madero mounted a vigorous electoral challenge to Daz in , he was arrested and the opposition press shut down. The Porrian state was clearly personalistic focused on Daz ; exclusionary of all serious challengers, including new elites; and repressive when all else failed.
On the eve of its revolution Mexico was rich in expressions of resistance to Dazs rule, in the form of vibrant, if nascent, political cultures that included anarchism, agrarian populism, nationalism, and liberalism. After an initial orescence in the s they were forced underground by Daz until a new upswing began around , organized in part around the Flores Mag on brothers who founded the PLM in , calling for free speech, agrarian reform, and labor legisla- tion.
Local revolts in and failed and the Flores Mag on had to operate outside the country. In the end anarchism was limited to a part of the working class and some intellectuals, and not capable of uniting opposition to Daz, who repressed it forcefully, but its egalitarian ideals contributed to the anti-authoritarian leveling that appeared after Indigenous political culture was based on millenarianism, a 38 Part Two: Revolutionary success return of social justice, restoration of lands, and expulsion of intruders.
The veneration of saints in Sonora and Morelos added a religious cast to moral outrage as well. In the north and highlands everywhere, ranchers, smallholders, and communal villagers articulated an independent stand against central control a stance associated with serranos peoples of the highlands that would evolve into the cross-class populismof the various stages of the revolution.
There was widespread agreement with the senti- ments of Cruz Chavez, the Tomochic leader of , who told travelers that his people simply wanted that no-one should interfere with them, nor bother themfor anything, nor meddle in their affairs. Behind both rural and urban grievances lay a growing nationalism generated in part by the Daz cliques pref- erence for things foreign, and fueled by the rural encroachments and industrial pay differentials between Mexicans and foreigners in mining, the railways, and elsewhere.
Francisco Madero, from a rich landed family, was educated in Paris and Berkeley in the s and evolved a liberal, spiritualist humanism at that time. Government attacks on Liberal clubs in convinced him that the Daz government would not reform itself, but had to be changed from without. Maderos early views on radical issues were vague and his later rule showed him to be a moder- ate, but in the period before the revolution he stood for the right to union- ize, for improved conditions yet far short of a real land reform in the countryside, stopping the onslaught of the large US trusts though not all foreign capital , and above all, for democracy and fair elections.
The great social revolutions 39 The internal aspect of this crisis took the form of a series of eco- nomic downturns between and , the most severe between and The nancial crises in Europe hit Mexican investments hard, dampening the boom that had begun in the s. In a fall in the price of silver led to less mining output, strikes, and unemployment. This was compounded by a two-year drought that began in Sugar production fell in Morelos and unemployed workers crowded city streets. Famine in the north and center due to the decline in corn crops necessitated ve million pesos of corn imports in , fteen million in , and twelve million in Cotton output fell, affecting textiles, where wages declined and unemployment rose.
Imports plummeted by 50 percent from to , and government income by 26 percent from to The states scal conservatism prevented it from spend- ing its way out of the crisis, as debt servicing grew to 25 percent of its budget. Moreover, in early , the economy turned down again and prices soared, especially in the north, just as the rebellion gathered steam. So while Knight rightly notes The timetable of middle-class protest was determined not, in some mechanical fashion, by the crises of the business cycle, but by the political chronology of the s the Creelman interview[in which Daz had told a North American journalist he would not seek reelection], the impending elections 24 this only highlights the powerful conjunc- tural effect of economic downturn and political cultures of opposition, both of which were available by where they had not been a decade earlier.
The nal link in this chain of processes was the world-systemic open- ing at the time of Maderos uprising.
- Don Quixote de la Mancha (part II): being the spurious continuation of Miguel de Cervantes Part I.
- Taking Power - John Foran - Häftad () | Bokus.
- French Revolution for Kids!
- The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond.
- Main navigation;
To some degree, rivalries between Europe and the United States may have stayed American intervention in the crisis, but to a much larger degree the internal policy uncertainties of the Taft administration and the interests of individual American capitalists played a favorable role in Maderos victory. Conicts arose between the Daz government and the US over naval maneuvers in Baja in , Mexican refuge for deposed Nicaraguan president Zelaya in , oil contracts with British companies, and land disputes near the border in Texas.
Taft personally would have liked to help Daz but moved rather slowly for various domestic reasons the Democrats had just gained control of Congress in late and accused him of connections 40 Part Two: Revolutionary success to Mexican capital. On March 6, , Taft concentrated troops on the border for routine maneuvers seemingly aimed at preventing more arms and men from crossing over to the rebels. Ironically, the action was perceived as an insult by Daz and as a threaten- ing message of dwindling US condence in him by the Mexican public.
These developments resulted in a fairly swift victory for the rebels under Maderos banner in the spring of Several incipient armies responded to Maderos November call for an uprising to oust Daz and restore democracy, led by Pascual Orozco and Francisco Villa in the north, Emiliano Zapata south of Mexico City, and numerous local gures elsewhere. By late May there was rebellion throughout Mexico, and the Federal army was stretched to breaking point against up to 70, loosely organized insurgents.
Daz, in poor health and with no visible domestic or international support, resigned on May 25, , securing from Madero a compromise that preserved the army and much of the government. Victory was the prod- uct of a disparate, multi-class alliance of the social groups and classes that had been adversely affected by dependent development and the Porrian repression. The middle classes everywhere wanted more responsible government; they were perhaps the natural core of Maderos liberal democratic movement.
Women engaged in urban bread riots in and some became revolutionary soldaderas even at this early date. In the center and south, where hacienda encroachments had occurred but enough free villages still remained, as in Morelos, Puebla, and Tlaxcala, peasants engaged in land seizures and joined the rebel armies. These movements included indigenous and mestizo villagers and smallholders. The plantation economy of the south, with its high pro- portion of peons and few free villages, did not become active to any comparable degree in this phase of the revolution.
Throughout Mexico, The great social revolutions 41 while leaders tended to come from slightly higher class positions than the rank and le, they were local people in most cases, not outsiders. In two senses, then, the revolution was a multi-class affair: within each region, and across the country as a whole. In Knights words: it was a complex, collective experience, to which many groups contributed in different ways and for different reasons.
As is well known, the Mexican revolution did not end in While space does not permit extensive analysis of its course from to , the factors used in accounting for its outbreak and initial success exer- cised continuing force on its subsequent tortuous course and eventual outcome. Madero fell in after alienating both lower-class rebels and the US. A renewed multi-class coalition ousted the dictator Huerta from power in , then fragmented into complex regional and cross-class movements that engaged in their own civil war, pitting radical forces led by Villa and Zapata against moderate bourgeois leaders Carranza and Obreg on.
The timing and outcome of these struggles continued to have much to do with such factors as the contending political cultures, internal economic conditions, and the world-systemic conjuncture. Maderos rule did not resolve the issues that caused the revolution. But as Knight notes, he was caught between the demands of the lower classes to solve urgent prob- lems, andof hacendados, army ofcers, andofcials to maintainthe status quo, proving himself unable to please either.
Zapata engaged in guerrilla warfare against government troops, whose ofcer corps Madero had kept intact and whose numbers he had built up from 20, under Daz to 70, To this may be added military revolts, local riots, small-scale peasant uprisings, and wide-spread social banditry. Ambas- sador Henry Lane Wilson characterized Maderos government as inept, capricious, dishonest, tyrannical, intolerant, and hypocritical.
Instead, with the clear support of Wilson, Huerta staged a coup in the midst of the ghting, on February 18, and had Madero killed four days later, with tacit local US approval. Maderos murder, and the subsequent repression of the labor movement and fraudulent elections in October marked Huerta as a dictator and discredited him with the urban middle and working classes. Resistance to his rule began within days after his coup, as fol- lowers of Venustiano Carranza, governor of Coahuila, took up arms, and as revolutionary forces were reactivated by Pancho Villa in the north, Alvaro Obreg on from Sonora down the Pacic coast, and Zapata south of the capital.
These disparate groups especially Villas forces inicted numerous defeats on Huertas undertrained and underpaid army in late and early Knight calls them the old Maderista coalition of , the urban civilians and the rural populists; a coalition of awe- some power. This world-systemic opening was effected by the United States letting arms ow to his opponents, now known as the Constitutionalists, and letting the civil war decide matters.
Internally defeated and exter- nally without allies, Huerta nally stepped down on July 15, Maderos political revolution now secured, the victors turned to the issue of social revolution in late In October, all the anti-Huerta forces, already sparring with each other, met in a convention at Aguas- calientes, where the chasm was conrmed between the radical followers of Villa and Zapata, on the one hand, known as the Conventionists, and the more moderate supporters of Carranza and Obreg on, on the other, known as the Constitutionalists, with both claiming power.
While it is hard to denitively distinguish the two sides in class terms, Knight points toward an underlying perception of cultural differences, as the urban, The great social revolutions 43 commercial, nationalist, literate, secular, and bureaucratic Constitution- alists viewed their opponents as parochial, rural, illiterate, Catholic, per- sonalist, and ascriptive, 41 and Hart notes the profoundly contrasting goals of the two forces. Neither sought political power, however, andno comprehensive national programwas put forward beyond the revolutionary agrarian demands of the Plan de Ayala.
Radical as it was in the countryside, the political culture of Zapatismo did not encompass the broad spectrum of the revolutions forces. Carranza and Obreg on built a broader alliance than either Villa or Zapata, who were henceforth geographically isolated from each other. Obreg on gained crucial working class support by his overtures to Mexico Citys progressive labor confederation, the Casa del Obrero Mundial; promised agrarian reform to the peasantry; and was more open than Villa to the participation of women soldaderas in his army.
As Katz puts it: The Zapata movement tended to be well-nigh invincible at its center, but virtually ineffectual beyond its connes, this due to its lack of arms, transport, and motivation to do more than defend Morelos. The drafting of the constitution set the stage for a nal struggle between Carranza and the more radical Obreg on. Carranza ruled Mexico formally from to , though supporters of Obreg on dominated the congressional 44 Part Two: Revolutionary success elections.
Economic difculties unemployment, ination, debt, and food shortages, compounded by epidemic disease undermined Carranzas popularity though minerals and oil kept the state aoat. Organized urban labor was dealt a blowby the newregime in a series of confrontations, culminat- ing in the unsuccessful general strike of July 31August 2, and the establishment in of the pro-government Confederaci on Regional de Obreros Mexicanos.
Guerrilla move- ments continued to disrupt the countryside, though the strongest Zapatas was worn down by counterinsurgency and the murder of its leader in April When Carranza tried to keep Obreg on out of power in by naming his own successor, he was killed eeing the coun- try, leaving Obreg on as president from to With his neme- sis Carranza gone, Villa made peace with the government but he too was assassinated in mysterious circumstances on his hacienda in By then the revolution was for all intents and purposes over.
As Hart puts it: Obreg on Salido functioned as the ultimate compromiser capa- ble of negotiating with Carrancistas, Villistas, workers, Zapatistas, and Americans. Obreg on himself was killed by a reli- gious extremist in the revolution devoured its leaders. What did the revolution accomplish, and how should we evaluate it? In many respects, it is debatable whether it was fully-edged social rev- olution, and the most radical workers and peasants not to mention the women and indigenous ghters in the popular forces were with- out doubt defeated.
Knight and Hart, in many ways at odds with each other, agree that there was a social revolution, with tremendous mass participation that had consequential impacts on the lives of those who made it. Though far from democratic, The great social revolutions 45 it claimed signicant peasant and worker support in its institutions, and forged a single party, eventually and tellingly titled the Partido Revolu- cionario Institucional PRI.
Two decades after the revolution, Lazaro C ardenas made good on the promise of oil nationalization in and distributed signicant land back to the communities. It was only after that this state was denitively turned to the elite project of national capitalist development, resuming the rhythms of dependency that would lead to a new revolutionary movement in the story of the latter-day Zapatistas ongoing attempted revolution is chronicled in Chapter Five.
Adolfo Gillys brilliant interpretation allows a way through these debates. He sees a denite, yet complexly unfolding social revolution: If we use the yardstick of mass intervention and mobilization, weighing up their spatial and temporal extent and the changes in the life, habits and mentality of millions of men and women, then the Mexican Revolution was unquestionably one of the most profound in Latin America and of the greatest anywhere in this century so rich in revolutions.
As a result of the explosive social, political and economic contradictions peculiar to capitalist development in Mexico, the Mexican people underwent a hitherto unprecedented experience. They burst onto the historical stage and lived for a time as its main protagonists. Feeling themselves to be the subject, and no longer the mere object of history, they stored up a wealth of experience and consciousness which altered the whole country as it is lived by its inhabitants.
It was impossible to ignore or depreciate this change in the decades that followed. It was, therefore, an interrupted revolution, in which the peasantry. Huerta then acted as a classical dictatorial foil for the revolutionaries to regroup. Victory eluded the forces of Villa and Zapata in owing to their inability to forge a broad political alliance and cultural consensus, even among themselves. Again, economic downturn, US withdrawal of support, and exclusionary political practices helped bring about Carranzas downfall. In the end, though the Mexican revolution just barely qualies as a social revolu- tion, its causation ts well with our model.
I am teaching an undergraduate course on "Human Rights" this term and last week the topic was "Universalism vs. Cultural Rela Seasons Greetings and Best wishes for just and peaceful Of Slavery, Monuments and Commemorations. The contentious issue of Reparations for Slavery seems to be engaging more and more academic interest these days as evident from the followi A bullied "one-armed youngster" drafted a world-changing document A central figure in the development of the Universal Zera Yacob's Hatata.winczideless.tk
Project MUSE - Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions (review)
African Precursor to Enlightenment Liberalism. There has been resurgent interest in the seventeenth century Ethiopian philosopher and thinker, Zera Yacob also identified as Zara Yaco And some products are so sophisticated that it helps to have the people who design them and the people who make them in the same place. Consumers will have little difficulty adapting to the new age of better products, swiftly delivered. Governments, however, may find it harder. Their instinct is to protect industries and companies that already exist, not the upstarts that would destroy them.
They shower old factories with subsidies and bully bosses who want to move production abroad. They spend billions backing the new technologies which they, in their wisdom, think will prevail. And they cling to a romantic belief that manufacturing is superior to services, let alone finance. None of this makes sense.
The lines between manufacturing and services are blurring. Rolls-Royce no longer sells jet engines; it sells the hours that each engine is actually thrusting an aeroplane through the sky. Governments have always been lousy at picking winners, and they are likely to become more so, as legions of entrepreneurs and tinkerers swap designs online, turn them into products at home and market them globally from a garage. As the revolution rages, governments should stick to the basics: better schools for a skilled workforce, clear rules and a level playing field for enterprises of all kinds.
Leave the rest to the revolutionaries. Join them. Subscribe to The Economist today. Media Audio edition Economist Films Podcasts. New to The Economist? Sign up now Activate your digital subscription Manage your subscription Renew your subscription. Topics up icon.
- Popular Posts.
- Using Video in Teacher Education (Advances in Research on Teaching, Volume 10).
- Revolutions and Revolutionaries;
- Revolution and War (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)!
- Principles of Ionic Organic Reactions;
- French Revolution for Kids?
Blogs up icon. Current edition. Audio edition. Economist Films. The Economist apps. More up icon.